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ABSTRACT 
 
 1Semiconductor supply chain is increasingly getting exposed to variety of security attacks 
such as Trojan insertion, cloning, counterfeiting, reverse engineering (RE), piracy of Intellectual 
Property (IP) or Integrated Circuit (IC) and side-channel analysis due to involvement of untrusted 
parties. In this thesis, we use threshold voltage-defined switches to design a logic gate that will 
camouflage the conventional logic gates both logically and physically to resist RE and IP piracy. 
The proposed gate can function as NAND, AND, NOR, OR, XOR, and XNOR robustly using 
threshold defined switches. We also propose a flavor of camouflaged gate that represents reduced 
functionality (NAND, NOR and NOT) at much lower overhead. The camouflaged design operates 
at nominal voltage and obeys conventional reliability limits. A small fraction of gates can be 
camouflaged to increase the RE effort extremely high. Simulation results indicate 46-53% area, 59-
68% delay and 52-76% power overhead when 5-15% gates are identified and camouflaged using 
the proposed gate. A significant higher RE effort is achieved when the proposed gate is employed 
in the netlist using controllability, observability and hamming distance sensitivity based gate 
selection metrics. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
2
Most of the companies outsource semiconductor device manufacturing which establishes 
a fair chance of the design being copied and duplicated. This causes financial loss to the 
companies. To prevent it, the semiconductor industry is focusing on hardware security, through 
which duplication of the design can be prevented by hiding the design from the manufacturing 
unit. Several ideas have been proposed to achieve hardware security, of which include split 
manufacturing, camouflaging using dummy contacts. In this thesis, we have used the idea of 
camouflaging but instead of dummy contacts, which would increase the cost of fabrication, we 
have designed a logic gate which can implement logic AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR and 
XNOR which can be used in place of any other logic gate in the circuit to make it difficult for the 
adversary to identify the design. However, this method comes with its own disadvantages, which 
in this case are the area, delay and power overhead the camouflage gate results in. To reduce the 
overhead, we propose another logic gate with can only implement the AND, OR and NOT 
logics. Several methods of choosing the logic gates in-order to result in lesser overhead are also 
proposed. 
1.1 Hardware Security 
Semiconductor supply chain is increasingly getting exposed to Reverse Engineering (RE) 
of Intellectual Property (IP). In the existing RE method the adversary de-layers the IC, 
determines the gate functionalities and their connectivity information, and, reconstructs the 
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netlist with an objective of compromising sensitive/classified information to reproduce or sell the 
pirated copy of the design. Split manufacturing [1] has been proposed to hide the interconnection 
between gates to discourage meaningful Trojan insertion. In this technique the front-end 
(transistors) is manufactured in untrusted foundry whereas the back-end (interconnect) is 
manufactured in trusted facility. Due to missing connectivity information the RE and Trojan 
insertion becomes harder for adversary. The layers are stacked in trusted facility to complete the 
manufacturing. Since the back-end cost is more than front-end, the cost benefit of outsourcing 
the fabrication is still preserved. Although promising, this technique is susceptible to yield loss 
during stacking due to misalignment. 
1.2 Camouflaging for Hardware Security 
Camouflaging of gates has been proposed to hide the logic functionality and make RE 
impossible or extremely hard or economically unviable. The primary objective is to hide the 
functionality of few chosen gates to increase the RE effort while keeping the power, performance 
and area overhead to a minimum. The adversary can still create a partial netlist with known gates 
and RE the missing gate functionalities recursively through carefully selected test patterns. It has 
been shown that careful camouflaging with ~10-40% overhead can increase the RE effort 
significantly [8]. Moreover, the RE effort can further be increased using camouflaged gates that 
exhibit multiple functionalities. One of the proposed methods for Camouflaging of gates is using 
dummy contacts [1-2] and  the gate can realize 3 functions at the cost of ~5X area and power 
overhead. Although dummy contacts hide the functionality it requires process change (hollow 
via) and fails to force exhaustive RE by attacker. Another method proposed is Programmable 
standard cells using control signals described in [3] which requires signal routing for each 
camouflaged gate. This increases the control overhead and could still be susceptible to RE if the 
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functionality of control circuit is determined through RE. Techniques to deceive the attacker 
using filler cells [4] and dummy transistors [5] have also been proposed. For sequential circuits, 
additional logic (black) states are introduced in the finite state machine [9-12], which allow the 
design to reach a valid state only using the correct key. In combinational logic, XOR/XNOR 
gates are introduced to conceal the functionality [13, 14]. Watermarking and passive metering 
techniques are also proposed to detect IC piracy [15, 16]. Therefore the existing art is either 
process costly, leave layout clues or offers limited RE resistance. 
The rest of the document is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the concept 
of threshold defined switch used in designing the proposed camouflaged gate.  The design and 
analysis of the switch is also discussed in Chapter 2.  The design and analysis of the 6-function 
and 3-function camouflaged gate is discussed in Chapter 3. Simulation setup and results of 
ISCAS’85 benchmarks with some of the logic gates in the circuits replaced with the two 
proposed camouflaged gates are shown in chapter 4.  Chapter 5 describes the challenges 
involved in using the camouflaged gate.  
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CHAPTER 2: THRESHOLD VOLTAGE DEFINED SWITCH 
 
 
3
In this chapter we first present the concept of threshold voltage defined switch. The 
design and analysis of the switch is also discussed. 
2.1 Threshold Voltage Defined Switch Design 
 
Fig. 2.1 shows the threshold voltage defined switch which is either a PMOS or an NMOS 
transistor. The threshold voltage of the switch (transistor) is adjusted such that it is either ON or 
OFF. Low threshold voltage (LVT) turns the switch ON as it offers low resistance and high 
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Figure 2.1: PMOS/NMOS switch ON/OFF demonstration. 
The gate voltage used is Vg and shift from VT, ΔVT = Δ 
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threshold voltage (HVT) turns the switch OFF because of the high resistance offered. The 
deviation of threshold voltage (ΔVT) from the normal threshold voltage (NVT) which gives an 
optimum value of delay and leakage power is selected to operate the switch in the camouflage 
gate.  The gate voltage of the switch is selected such that Vgs (Gate to source voltage) of the 
transistor is greater than LVT making the switch ON and lower than HVT making the switch 
OFF. Thus, the switch turns ON/OFF based on the threshold voltage (VT) asserted on it and the 
applied chosen gate voltage. For N-switch, high HVT and low gate bias voltage is good for 
leakage while low LVT, high gate bias voltage is good for performance and vice-versa for 
PMOS switch. 
2.2 Improving Switch Design 
 The switch design is quantified using ION/IOFF ratio. A good VT defined switch should 
offer high ON current and low OFF current. The gate voltage, HVT, LVT values and transistor 
sizes are tuned to maximize the ION/IOFF ratio. For N-switch, higher HVT values and lower 
gate voltage is good for leakage whereas lower LVT and higher gate voltage is good for 
performance and vice-versa is true for P-switch. The switch is characterized by LVT and HVT 
values, and, switch bias voltage that result in high ION/IOFF ratio, optimized delay that results 
in optimized delay. Fig. 2.2 shows the ION/IOFF ratio with respect to the offset in LVT/HVT 
values compared to NVT. It can be observed that high ION/IOFF ratio can be achieved for very 
low LVT and high HVT values. 
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2.3 Design Space Exploration 
 For design space exploration we have used transistors in 45nm technology node. The 
LVT and HVT values are calculated by determining their offset from NVT value. The offset is 
swept from 0.1 to 0.5 in steps of 0.05. For example, if the NVT of NMOS transistor is 0.62V an 
offset of 0.1V means that the LVT is 0.52V and HVT is 0.72V. We also evaluate the delay of 
various gate topologies implemented using the proposed camouflaged gate. The gate delay with 
the offset of LVT/HVT values from NVT is shown in Fig. 2.3. The higher offset shows lower 
delay. This is due to the fact that lower LVT reduces the resistance of N switch whereas higher 
HVT increases resistance of OFF switch. Finally the impact of switch bias voltage on delay is 
shown in Fig. 2.4. A higher gate voltage lowers the resistance of ON switch making the circuit 
faster. Considering the optimal delay from figures (2.2 – 2.4), an offset of 0.35V from NVT is 
selected for LVT/HVT. The switch bias voltage is selected to be 0.68V. Note that the analysis is 
done for the NMOS switch. However, similar analysis also holds true for PMOS switch and the 
bias voltage is 0.38V.  
Figure 2.2: ION/IOFF ratio of switch for optimized delay 
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Figure 2.4: Gate bias voltage of switch for optimized delay 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: ΔVT for optimized delay  
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CAMOUFLAGED GATE 
 
4
The threshold voltage defined switches are used in conjunction with NVT transistors to 
camouflage a gate. In this thesis, we propose a logic gate using VT defined switches that can 
perform AND, OR , NAND, NOR, XOR and XNOR operations. Thus, the gate can be used to 
camouflage any other logic gate in the circuit. We will see in the analysis of this gate that the 
overhead imposed by the gate is considerably high. As an alternative, a low overhead gate that 
can perform AND, OR and NOT operations is presented. 
3.1 Proposed Camouflaged Gate 
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Figure 3.1: 6-function camouflaged gate with VT defined switches 
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Fig. 3.1 shows the schematic of camouflaged gate that exhibits 6-functionalitites (AND, 
OR, NAND, NOR, XOR and XNOR). The switches that have to be ON (asserted to LVT) to 
realize different functionalities is shown in Table 1. 
 
Logic ON (LVT)  switches 
AND S2, S7 
OR S3, S6 
NAND S1, S8 
NOR S4, S5 
XOR S6, S8 
XNOR S5, S7 
 
For example, by asserting LVT on switches S2 and S7 and HVT on all other switches, a 
parallel connection of PMOS transistors and a series connection of NMOS transistors can be 
obtained and a AND logic can be realized (Fig. 3.2).  
The design is optimized to lower delay overhead by, (i) tuning the VT of HVT and LVT 
transistors; (ii) separating the P and N switch gate voltages and biasing them to improve the 
robustness; and, (iii) sizing the transistors accordingly (Fig. 3.3). Note that the performance and 
area of the proposed camouflaged gate is strongly correlated to the resistance of ON and OFF 
switches in the path. Considering the widths of all the switches, area of the proposed 
camouflaged design is calculated to be 2.64µm
2
. 
 
 
Table 1: LVT switches for different logic implementation of camouflage gate 
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Figure 3.2: AND logic implementation using the proposed camouflaged gate 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Switch sizing to optimize delay 
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3.2 Analysis of Proposed Gate 
 Table 2 shows the comparative analysis in terms of area, delay and power of the proposed 
camouflage gate with respect to standard gates using HSPICE simulations. It can observed that a 
single camouflaged gate can incur 6-12X area, up to 2X delay and 17X power overhead 
depending on the size and functionality of the standard gate. Therefore the proposed gate should 
be used carefully in the netlist to maximize the RE effort while staying within the power, 
performance and delay overheads. 
 
3.3 Low-Overhead Camouflaged Gate  
 The camouflaged gate proposed above offers high resistance to RE since it exhibits 6 
functionalities. However it comes at the expense of design overhead. We propose a low-
overhead flavor of camouflaged gate with 3 functionalities i.e., NOT, NAND and NOR 
(Fig.3.4).This design is based on static CMOS. The switches that have to be asserted with HVT 
and LVT are also seen in the figure. The gate voltage of switches in this gate is 0.48V. 
Logic Area(µm^2) Delay(ps) Power(µW) 
AND 2.64(12.54X) 130(1.57X) 3.5(13.21X) 
OR 2.64(12.6X) 76(0.96X) 3.12(10.91X) 
NAND 2.64(12.63X) 89(2.2X) 3.47(16.89X) 
NOR 2.64(12.63X) 77(2X) 3.02(16.87X) 
XOR 2.64(6.31X) 90(1.09X) 3.11(8.27X) 
XNOR 2.64(6.31X) 87(1.22X) 3.48(1.35X) 
Table 2: Analysis of camouflaged gate with respect to standard logic gate © [2016] IEEE 
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Logic Area(µm^2) Delay(ps) Power(µW) 
AND 1.68(7.98X) 126(1.52X) 2.34(8.83X) 
OR 1.68(8.02X) 99(1.25X) 1.3(4.54X) 
NAND 1.44(6.89X) 80(1.98X) 0.93(4.53X) 
NOR 1.44(6.89X) 58(1.51X) 0.92(5.14X) 
NOT 1.44 49 0.9 
 
Figure 3.4: Low-overhead camouflaged gate to implement NOT,NAND and NOR logics  
        © [2016] IEEE 
Table 3: Analysis of low-overhead camouflaged gate wrt standard logic gate 
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3.4 Analysis of Low-Overhead Camouflaged Gate 
 Table 3 shows the comparative analysis of the proposed low-overhead camouflaged gate 
with respect to standard gate. It `can be observed that it has a maximum of 8X area, up to 2X 
delay and 9X power overhead which is less than the 6-function camouflaged gate. The 3-
function camouflage gate has lesser number of NVT transistors as that of the 6-function 
camouflage gate (3 inverters in 6-function gate while only 2 inverters in 3-function gate), saving 
significant amount of area and power. The proposed gate should be used judiciously in the 
design to minimize the overall design overhead. System level techniques such as converting off-
critical path gates (lower delay overhead), low-activity gates (lower power overhead) and more 
complex gates (lower area overhead) to camouflaged gate can be used to minimize the 
overheads.  
3.5 Analysis of Existing Camouflaged Gates  
 We have also analyzed the existing camouflaged gate proposed in [3] and compared the 
results with standard gate resulting in Table 4 and the camouflaged gate in [2] giving comparison 
results as shown in Table 2 of [2]. Camouflaged gate in [2] has about 4X area overhead, 2X 
delay overhead and 5X power overhead while that in [3] has 7X area overhead, 1X delay 
overhead and 5X power overhead  
Functionality Area (µm2) Delay (ps) Power (µW) 
OR 1.44 (6.87X) 86 (1.09X) 1.33 (4.65X) 
AND 1.44 (6.84X) 96 (1.16X) 1.34 (5.06X) 
Table 4: Analysis of the camouflaged gate in [3] with respect to standard gate 
 
14 
 
This analysis shows that the low-overhead camouflage gate has almost the same overhead 
as the gates already proposed. But it is better in tackling reverse engineering because it does not 
leave any traces on the layout and incurs no additional process cost. 
3.6 Robustness of the Proposed Gate 
 In this section we discuss the robustness of the proposed camouflaged gate. First we 
describe the simulation setup and then perform Supply Voltage Variation, Process and 
Temperature Variation (Monte Carlo analysis and Skew analysis). 
3.6.1 Simulation Setup 
 To perform temperature analysis, the temperature is varied from -10oC to 100oC in steps 
of 10
o
C and propagation delay of the camouflaged gate at different temperatures is calculated. 
Skew analysis is performed by calculating propagation delay of the camouflaged gate for 
different process corners of PMOS and NMOS transistors such as SS, SF, FS and FF (where S 
means the transistor is slow which in turn means the threshold voltage of that transistor is lower 
than the threshold used in the design of the gate and F means the transistor is fast i.e. the 
threshold of this transistor is higher than the one used in the design of the gate. SF represents 
slow NMOS and fast PMOS correspondingly. Similarly, SS is slow NMOS and slow PMOS. TT 
represents the corner for original rise delay with thresholds used in the design of the gate). The 
variation used for this analysis is +/- 100mV and from the original threshold voltage. For Monte 
Carlo analysis we consider Pelgrom’s constant, AVT = 3 to calculate the absolute variation of 
threshold voltage from the nominal value for different transistor sizes using the formula 
AVT/√L*W, where L is the length and W is the width of corresponding transistors. The 
AGAUSS( ) function is used to define 5000 different Monte Carlo simulation values with 
sigma=1 which means standard deviation = absolute deviation. Another process variation is 
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where the supply voltage is varied +/-10% from the original value (1V) i.e. the gate is simulated 
with 0.9V and 1.1V supply voltage also. 
3.6.2 Results 
 Skew analysis of camouflaged gate shows that there can be >200% (worst case) of 
increase in propagation delay at the worst corner SS when compared to the typical values as 
shown in Fig. 3.5. The best case shows an increase of >160% in propagation delay for the worst 
corner SS. Thus, it is seen that propagation delay is at least 1.5X in the worst case corner SS. 
  
Fig. 3.6 shows +/-10% Vdd variation. It can be seen that the propagation delay becomes 
2X when Vdd is reduced by 10% and delay reduces to 0.75X on an average when Vdd is increased 
by 10%. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Skew analysis of camouflaged gate for a 100mV threshold variation 
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Monte Carlo analysis of camouflaged gate and standard gate gives the results as shown in 
Fig. 3.7 – 3.9. Fig. 3.7 shows the Mean (µ) of propagation delay of camouflaged gate and 
standard gate for different functionalities. It can be inferred that the delay of the camouflaged 
gate changes significantly due to process variation as compared to standard gate but the variation 
is almost of the same proportion as seen in Table-I. In the worst case of NAND gate, the mean is 
>200% the mean of standard XOR gate; it is about 32% for AND gate which is the best case and 
an average increase of 145% in the mean of propagation delay. Fig. 3.8 shows the standard 
deviation (σ) of  delay of camouflaged gate and standard gate for different logic implementations 
as a result of process variation using Monte Carlo analysis. The worst case is in the case of NOR 
logic implementation of camouflaged gate where the standard deviation is about 450% greater 
than the standard NOR gate, best case of AND gate where the standard deviation of standard 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Robustness of camouflage gate to supply voltage variation 
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gate is greater than that of the camouflaged gate and an average of about 130% higher standard 
deviation of the camouflaged gate compared to the standard gate. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Mean of delay of the camouflaged gate wrt standard gate 
Figure 3.8: Standard deviation of delay of camouflage gate wrt standard gate 
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 The relative variability plot from Fig. 3.9 shows the plot of σ/µ for different types of 
gates, camouflaged and standard. The ratio is 50% less for camouflaged gate when compared to 
standard gate in the case NAND logic while it is 175% greater than that of standard gate ratio for 
NOR (worst case). 
 Temperature analysis of the gate for the range -10
o
C to 100
o
C shows that there can be as 
much as 64% (worst case) to 48% (best case) increase in delay at a 100
o
C temperature from that 
at  -10
o
C (Fig. 3.10). Thus, process variation varies delay significantly when compared to 
standard gate and the temperature analysis also shows about 50% increase in delay with 
temperature. 
Figure 3.9: Relative variability of camouflaged gate 
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Figure 3.10: Robustness of camouflage gate to temperature 
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CHAPTER 4: CAMOUFLAGING STRATEGIES AND THEIR EVALUATION 
 
 
5
In this chapter, we will discuss different selection techniques to select logic gates from a 
netlist to be replaced by the camouflaged gate. We also discuss the simulation setup to evaluate 
these techniques and calculate the overhead incurred by the camouflaged gate. 
4.1 Gate Selection Strategies 
 In this section we propose three techniques to select gates for camouflaging to maximize 
the RE effort namely, based on controllability and observability (HTCO), based on hamming 
distance (HDS) and combination of HTCO and HDS called HTRE. 
4.1.1 Selection Based on Controllability and Observability (HTCO) 
 We calculate the controllability and observability of each gate in the netlist. The gates 
connected to the Primary Inputs (PIs) are hard to observe and easy to control while the gates 
connected to primary outputs (POs) are easy to observe and hard to control. As the depth of gates 
in the logic increases, they become difficult to observe and hard to control as well. Such gates 
that are both Hard-to-Control (HTC) and Hard-to-Observe (HTO) are an ideal choice for 
camouflaging. However, finding such gates in the design is nearly impossible. To determine the 
Hard-to-Control and Observe (HTCO) gates, we add controllability and observability of the 
inputs and outputs: HTCO = CC0+CC1+O. 
                                                          
5
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4.1.2 Selection Based on Hamming Distance (HDS) 
 The Hamming Distance Sensitivity (HDS) is analytically computed by adding the 
differential change in POs by changing the response of a gate for an exhaustive set of test 
vectors. Theoretically it determines the ability of a gate to maximize the change in POs for a 
given test vector. It is notable that a gate which can be reached from maximum number of POs 
will have higher potential to affect the POs. Therefore such gates will have higher HDS. We use 
this metric and create a list of gates in descending order of HDS values and select top gates for 
camouflaging. 
4.1.3 Selection Based on a Combination of HTCO and HDS (HTRE) 
 To maximize the RE effort we add both the HTCO and HDS metric of the gates to 
determine Hard-to-RE (HTRE): HTRE=HTCO+HDS. 
4.2 Simulation Setup 
 Here, we discuss library file, used for characterizing the cell (camouflaged gate) and the 
logic synthesis tool used, called DC_SHELL. 
4.2.1 Library File 
 The following paragraph explains the use of library file in the synthesis of a netlist. 
 “To synthesize an RTL Verilog/VHDL file to a netlist, need two input files:  
– The RTL file itself  
– A compiled library file (mylib.db). The .db format is a binary format used 
by Synopsys for compiled designs/libraries 
The library file specifies what cells are in your library, their functions, pin names, 
timing/power characteristics  
– The ASCII form of the library usually has a ‘.lib’ extension6.”  
                                                          
6
 Information is reprinted from [20] with permission. Copyright permission included in Appendix B. 
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The libraries used in this thesis include NangateOpenCellLibrary.db and the library file 
of the camouflaged gate. 
The library definition file is broken into two sections explained as follows. 
– “A header section that defines attributes to be used by all cells in the 
library 
– A cell section that has a definition for each cell in the library. A cell’s 
definition defines attributes about the cell such as pin names, area, 
functionality, timing, power, etc
7
.” 
 
These attributes are calculated using HSpice and used in the library file. An example of 
library file is shown in Appendix A. 
The cells cand, cor, cnand, cnor, cxor and cxnor represent the camouflage gate 
implementing the logic AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR and XNOR respectively. Intrinsic_rise 
and intrinsic_fall are the rise and fall delay values with input and output threshold set to 0.5 i.e. 
intrinsic_rise delay is the difference in timing points for the input signal at 0.5V while rising and 
the output signal at 0.5V while rising. Rise_resistance and fall_resistance is the delay of the gate 
per capacitance unit. The delay here is calculated with thresholds being 0.1 and 0.9.  Internal 
power look up table takes the energy values for the time interval where output transition takes 
place while the input signal is not transitioning. 
4.2.2 DC_Shell 
 DC_SHELL is a tool used to synthesize an RTL/VHDL netlist. The series of commands 
used in the process to synthesize the ISCAS’85 benchmark netlists after replacing some of the 
gates with the camouflaged gate is  
1. set target_library "NangateOpenCellLibrary.db cam_lib.db" 
                                                          
7
 Information is reprinted from [20] with permission. Copyright permission included in Appendix B. 
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2. set synthetic_library "/apps/synopsys/syn/F-2011.09- 
SP4/libraries/syn/dw_foundation.sldb 
3. set link_library "$target_library $synthetic_library" 
4. read_verilog benchmark.v 
5. set TOPLEVEL top_module_name 
6. dont_touch camgate 
7. compile. 
 This compiles the netlists and synthesizes them. To obtain the area, delay and power 
values, the commands used are 
– Report_area (for area) 
– Report_timing (for delay) 
– Report_power (for power)  
The commands to convert a .lib file to a .db file are 
– read_lib libertyfilename.lib 
– write_lib -libertyfilename -f db -o dbfilename.db 
4.3 Evaluation of the Selection Techniques 
 The RE effort is determined using the methodology presented in [19] and is given by, RE 
effort = Tgate_level + Tdummy + [(Tfault injection + TATPG) + (Tfault injection + TATPG)] + {2*[Tpropagation + 
TATPG] + 2*Tintersection} where Tgate_level is time required to identify gate-level test pattern, 
Tfault_injection is the time to determine and insert dummy gates, Tdummy is the time to inject stuck-at 
fault at gate input, TATPG is the time to find the pattern by the ATPG tool, Tpropagation is the time to 
propagate the fault effect to the PO, and, Tintersection is the time to find the common pattern to 
sensitize and propagate the   fault. The details are omitted for the sake of brevity. In RE effort 
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estimation a clock frequency of 1GHz (1ns cycle time) is assumed for each combination of gate-
level test pattern generation/application. Note that the proposed 6-function camouflaged gate 
ensures brute-force for RE (2’b00/2’b11 is needed to identify XOR/XNOR gate and 2’b01/2’b10 
is needed to identify NAND/NOR/AND/OR gates). 
  Fig. 4.1 shows the area of benchmark circuits for 0% (i.e., no-camouflaging), 5%, 10% 
and 15% camouflaging for 6-function and 3-function camouflaged gates for various selection 
metrics. Different gates in a benchmark netlist are arranged in descending order of the metric 
values (controllability and observability) and those gates that top the list are selected for 
camouflaging. From the figure, we can see that the area overhead due to 3-function camouflaged 
gate is lower than that of 6-function camouflaged gate. This is evident as the area of 6-function 
camouflaged gate is 2.64µm
2
 while the area of 3-function camouflaged gate is 1.44µm
2
. The 
average area overhead of 6-function (3-function) camouflaged gate is 46%-53% (24-28%). Fig. 
4.2 shows the delay of benchmark circuits. The delay of the critical path does not increase 
proportionately as the critical path may not necessarily contain camouflaged gates. The average 
delay overhead of 6-function (3-function) camouflaged gate is 59%-68% (37-48%). The power 
of different benchmark circuits are given in Fig. 4.3.  Power increases with increase in the 
number of camouflaged gate as they consume higher amount of active power and short circuit 
current especially for the 6-function camouflaged gate. The average power overhead of 6-
function (3-function) camouflaged gate is 52%-76% (25-40%). However, delay of the circuit can 
be reduced by making sure that the gates in the critical path are not camouflaged. 
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Figure 4.1: Area of ISCAS’85 benchmarks for 0, 5%, 10% and 15% camouflaging. 
This is evaluated with 6-function and 3-function gates for random, HTCO, HDS and HTRE 
selection metrics 
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Figure 4.2: Delay of ISCAS’85 benchmarks for 0, 5%, 10% and 15% camouflaging. 
This is evaluated with 6-function and 3-function gates for random, HTCO, HDS and HTRE 
selection metrics 
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Figure 4.3: Power of ISCAS’85 benchmarks for 0, 5%, 10% and 15% camouflaging. 
This is evaluated with 6-function and 3-function gates for random, HTCO, HDS and HTRE 
selection metrics 
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Figure 4.4: RE effort of benchmarks with 0%, 5%, 10% and 15% camouflaging. 
This is evaluated with 6-function gate for (a) HTCO; (b) HDS; and, (c) HTRE selection 
metrics 
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Fig. 4.4 plots the RE effort obtained using HTCO, HDS and HTRE gate selection metrics 
for 5-15% camouflaging. Only 6-function camouflaged gate is assumed in this analysis. It can be 
noted that the RE effort increases significantly with higher percentage of camouflaging. 
Furthermore gate selection using HTRE shows best RE effort. Therefore the proposed 
camouflaged gates can be combined with the HTRE gate selection metric to maximize RE effort 
at reasonable design overheads. 
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CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION ON TEST CHIP 
 
 For a practical evaluation of the efficiency of the proposed gate, we have designed a 
layout of the gate forming a ring oscillator for each of the 6 functionalities performed by it. Each 
ring oscillator has 21 gates and the test chip has these 6 ring oscillators chosen to be ON by 
turning ON the power gating PMOS transistor. 
 Fig.5.1 shows the layout of the proposed camouflaged gate designed using CMOS 
switches and the layout of the test chip with the layouts of ring oscillators of camouflaged gate 
with CMOS switches and NMOS switches along with the layout of regular gate with power 
gating is shown in fig.5.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Layout of camouflaged gate with CMOS switch 
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The test chip also has multiplexer (mux) designed to place in the paths of a signal in 
order to camouflage the correct path of the signal. This makes it difficult for the adversary to 
track the path of a signal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Test chip layout 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 8We propose novel threshold voltage-defined switches to camouflage the logic gate both 
logically and physically to resist RE and IP piracy. The proposed camouflaged gate can assume 
the role of wide variety of gates including NAND, AND, NOR, OR, XOR, XNOR robustly using 
threshold defined switches. The camouflaged design operates at nominal voltage and obeys 
conventional reliability limits. A low-overhead flavor of camouflaged gate is also proposed. The 
design complexity is evaluated using automatic synthesis tools. The gates are selected using 
metrics using controllability, observability and hamming distance sensitivity to maximize RE 
effort while preserving the design overhead.  The proposed gate is shown to be vulnerable to 
temperature variation and process variation of threshold voltage and some mitigation techniques 
to subside the effect of these variations have also been proposed. 
  
                                                          
8
 Information included in this chapter is reprinted from [19] with permission. Copyright permission included in Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX A: LIBRARY FILE 
 
Below is the example of a custom library file for the camouflaged gate. 
 
/******************************************** 
 * LIBRARY       : cam          * 
 * LIBRARY FAMILY   :          * 
 * DATE    :  nov 6 2015       *      
 *\ 
 *******************************************/ 
 
 library(cam){ 
 date     : "nov   6  2015" ; 
library_features(report_delay_calculation, report_power_calculation); 
 /* unit attributes */ 
 time_unit  : "1ns" ; 
 voltage_unit  : "1V"; 
 current_unit  : "1A"; 
 leakage_power_unit      : "1uW"; 
        pulling_resistance_unit : "1kohm"; 
 capacitive_load_unit  (1, ff); 
 
power_lut_template(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){ 
variable_1 : total_output_net_capacitance; 
variable_2 : input_transition_time; 
index_1 ("1,2,3,4"); 
index_2 ("0.1"); 
} 
/* Default cell attributes */ 
 default_max_transition   : 0.75100 ;        
 default_fanout_load            : 1.00000 ; 
 default_input_pin_cap          : 0.00000 ; 
 default_output_pin_cap         : 0.00000 ; 
 default_inout_pin_cap          : 0.00000 ; 
 default_wire_load_capacitance  : 0.005 ; 
 default_cell_leakage_power  : 0.000001 ; 
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 default_leakage_power_density  : 0.00000 ; 
 default_slope_rise  : 0.1; 
 default_slope_fall  : 0.1; 
 
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Default timing attributes: for a generic delay model. 
  This can be used to describe the DWM cell if we don't0 
   include timing within the cell 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 default_inout_pin_fall_res   : 1.0; 
 default_output_pin_fall_res  : 1.0; 
 default_inout_pin_rise_res   : 1.0; 
 default_output_pin_rise_res   : 1.0; 
 default_intrinsic_fall   : 1.0; 
 default_intrinsic_rise    : 1.0; 
  
 /*------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Used to set the values of the input and output pin  
   threshold points used to model delay and slew 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 input_threshold_pct_fall       : 50 ; 
 input_threshold_pct_rise       : 50 ; 
 output_threshold_pct_fall      : 50 ; 
 output_threshold_pct_rise      : 50 ; 
 slew_lower_threshold_pct_fall  : 10 ; 
 slew_upper_threshold_pct_fall  : 90 ; 
 slew_lower_threshold_pct_rise  : 10 ; 
 slew_upper_threshold_pct_rise  : 90 ; 
 slew_derate_from_library       : 1.00000 ; 
 nom_process                    : 1.00000; 
 nom_temperature                : 25.00000; 
 nom_voltage                    : 1.000; 
 
 
cell(cnand) { 
 area : 2.64; 
 cell_leakage_power : 0.025; 
  pin(A1) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
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 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(A2) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(ZN) { 
 direction : output; 
 function : "!(A1 * A2)"; 
 max_transition : 0.2; 
 timing() { 
 related_pin : " A1 "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.088; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.060; 
 rise_resistance : 0.005; 
 fall_resistance : 0.005; 
} 
timing() { 
 related_pin : " A2 "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.07; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.095; 
 rise_resistance : 0.005; 
 fall_resistance : 0.003; 
 
 } 
internal_power() { 
 related_pin : "A1 A2"; 
 rise_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){  
 values("10.13","10.26", "10.34", "10.44"); 
 } 
 fall_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){ 
 values("10.13","10.26", "10.34", "10.44"); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
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cell(cand) { 
 area : 2.64; 
 cell_leakage_power : 0.013; 
  pin(A1) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(A2) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(ZN) { 
 direction : output; 
 function : "A1 * A2"; 
 max_transition : 0.2; 
 timing() { 
 related_pin : " A1 "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.064; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.13; 
 rise_resistance : 0.005; 
 fall_resistance : 0.008; 
} 
timing() { 
 related_pin : " A2 "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.126; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.127; 
 rise_resistance : 0.005; 
 fall_resistance : 0.0076; 
 
 } 
internal_power() { 
 related_pin : "A1 A2"; 
 rise_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){  
 values("12.37", "12.28", "12.61", "12.76"); 
 } 
 fall_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){ 
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 values("12.37", "12.28", "12.61", "12.76"); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
cell(cor) { 
 area : 2.64; 
 cell_leakage_power : 0.020; 
  pin(A1) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(A2) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(ZN) { 
 direction : output; 
 function : "A1 + A2"; 
 max_transition : 0.2; 
 timing() { 
 related_pin : " A1 "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.058; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.094; 
 rise_resistance : 0.0047; 
 fall_resistance : 0.0063; 
} 
timing() { 
 related_pin : " A2 "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.136; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.153; 
 rise_resistance : 0.005; 
 fall_resistance : 0.0091; 
 
 } 
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internal_power() { 
 related_pin : "A1 A2"; 
 rise_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){  
 values("11.18", "11.44", "11.7", "11.912"); 
 } 
 fall_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){ 
 values("11.18", "11.44", "11.7", "11.912"); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
cell(cnor) { 
 area : 2.64; 
 cell_leakage_power : 0.022; 
  pin(A1) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(A2) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(ZN) { 
 direction : output; 
 function : "!(A1 + A2)"; 
 max_transition : 0.2; 
 timing() { 
 related_pin : " A1 "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.078; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.147; 
 rise_resistance : 0.0047; 
 fall_resistance : 0.0084; 
} 
timing() { 
 related_pin : " A2 "; 
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 intrinsic_rise  : 0.083; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.1; 
 rise_resistance : 0.005; 
 fall_resistance : 0.01; 
 
 } 
internal_power() { 
 related_pin : "A1 A2"; 
 rise_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){  
 values("10.022", "10.1756", "10.25", "10.22"); 
 } 
 fall_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){ 
 values("10.022", "10.1756", "10.25", "10.22"); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
cell(cxor) { 
 area : 2.64; 
 cell_leakage_power : 0.023; 
  pin(A) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(B) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(Z) { 
 direction : output; 
 function : "A ^ B"; 
 max_transition : 0.2; 
 timing() { 
 related_pin : " A "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.086; 
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 intrinsic_fall  : 0.113; 
 rise_resistance : 0.0047; 
 fall_resistance : 0.0085; 
} 
timing() { 
 related_pin : " B "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.082; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.099; 
 rise_resistance : 0.005; 
 fall_resistance : 0.009; 
 
 } 
internal_power() { 
 related_pin : "A B"; 
 rise_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){  
 values("10.407", "10.66", "10.87", "10.97"); 
 } 
 fall_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){ 
 values("10.407", "10.66", "10.87", "10.97"); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
cell(cxnor) { 
 area : 2.64; 
 cell_leakage_power : 0.017; 
  pin(A) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(B) { 
 direction : input; 
 capacitance : 5.6; 
 fanout_load : 1;  
 max_transition : 0.1; 
 } 
 pin(ZN) { 
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 direction : output; 
 function : "!(A ^ B)"; 
 max_transition : 0.2; 
 timing() { 
 related_pin : " A "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.063; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.093; 
 rise_resistance : 0.0048; 
 fall_resistance : 0.0072; 
} 
timing() { 
 related_pin : " B "; 
 intrinsic_rise  : 0.126; 
 intrinsic_fall  : 0.127; 
 rise_resistance : 0.0047; 
 fall_resistance : 0.0073; 
 
 } 
internal_power() { 
 related_pin : "A B"; 
 rise_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){  
 values("10.45", "10.578", "10.649", "10.84"); 
 } 
 fall_power(output_by_cap_and_trans_4X1){ 
 values("10.45", "10.578", "10.649", "10.84"); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
}  
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APPENDIX B: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS 
 
Below is the copyright permission for the material used in the abstract and chapters 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 6. 
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Below is the copyright permission for material used in Chapter 4.2.1 
 
